AMY H. LIU
State Institutions, Civic Associations and Identity Demands: Regional Movements in Greater Southeast Asia (Michigan 2024) – edited with Joel Sawat Selway
Both violent secessionist movements (Basque, Tigray, Zapatistas) and peaceful independence movements (Scotland, Catalonia) understandably attract the most attention from the media. As scholars, however, in order to fully understand the origins of these movements, we need to pay attention to regions where movements fail to take off as well as regions that experience no movements at all. In Southeast Asia, most ink has been spilled over places such as the Moros of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines, the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand, or Western Papua in Indonesia. But in each of these countries, as well as across the whole of Southeast Asia, there are scores of other regions to which we could fruitfully compare the more fully-developed regional movements. In this volume, we examine over a dozen regions that span the spectrum of mobilization, from cases of successful secession (East Timor, Singapore) and ongoing secessionist movements (Southern Philippines), to internally-divided regional movements (Kachin State), low-level regionalist stirrings (Lanna, Taiwan), and local but not regional mobilization of identity (Bali, Minahasan), all the way to failed movements (Bataks, S. Maluku) and regions that remain politically inert (East and North Malaysia, Northeast Thailand). Through this case selection and careful study of individual cases by expert scholars, two factors emerge that help explain why movements emerge and successfully develop: (1) the presence of cohesive and unified civic associations, and (2) the absence of full representation and inclusion in state institutions. [Publisher's Website] [Amazon]
Gender, Ethnicity, and Intersectionality in Cabinets (Cambridge 2025) – with Roman Hlatky, Keith Padraic Chew, Eoin L. Power, Sam Selsky, Betty Compton, and Meiying Xu
What explains the What explains patterns of representation – of women and ethnic minorities – in government cabinets? We argue governments diversify their cabinets when (1) a minority group – and it need not be ethnic – is sizable and can mobilize (political competition); and/or (2) the general population believes in and expects the inclusion of minorities (popular norms). We test their argument using original cabinet data from Asia and Europe (N=93) 1960–2015 and a controlled comparison of four case studies. We identify the gender and ethnicity of 91,000 country-year-minister observations – with consideration of the rank of their ministerial portfolio. We find evidence that in countries where there is political competition and/or popular norms, cabinets have fewer men from the hegemon ethnic group. However, this does not necessarily suggest minorities are holding portfolios of substantive prestige. This project offers a way to study intersectionality in democratic representation and political institutions.
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- A Theory on Minorities in Cabinets
- Minorities and Cabinet Compositions
- Minorities and Portfolio Prestige
- Minorities in Cabinets in Four Cases
- Democracy and Cabinet Composition
- Discussion: What Next?
Standardizing Diversity: The Political Economy of Language Regimes (Pennsylvania 2015)
Language regimes are the products of bargains between groups over whose languages to recognize. In turn, this choice can have economic implications. Using an original dataset of language-in-education policies (1945-2005) and drawing on fieldwork data from Southeast Asia, I show how linguistic power is distributed - e.g., if a lingua franca is recognized - can generate social trust, attract foreign investment, and promote economic growth. The findings suggest governments in even the most heterogeneous countries have institutional tools to standardize their diversity and to avoid the poverty trap. [Publisher's Website] [Amazon]
Table of Contents
- Introduction [pdf]
- Typology of Language Regimes
- Language Regime Choice: Theory
- Language Regime Choice: Evidence
- Economic Effects of Language Regimes: Theory
- Mechanism 1: Social Capital
- Mechanism 2: Foreign Capital
- Conclusion: Standardizing Diversity
The Language of Political Incorporation: Chinese Migrants in Europe (Temple 2021)
When migrants are situated in networks that use a lingua franca, they are more likely to trust authorities and engage with locals. The strength of these networks, however, is conditional on the absence of migrant-targeting policies. To test, I look at the Chinese in Central-Eastern Europe. Evidence includes the largest Chinese survey of its kind (N>2000); interviews in five countries; text analysis of newspaper articles in Hungary; and participant observation of a police raid in Romania. I compare the findings to Muslim migrants in the region, the Chinese elsewhere, and the implications for local attitudes towards the Chinese and other out-groups. [Publisher's Website] [Amazon]
Table of Contents
- Introduction [pdf]
- A Theory about Languages and Migrant Networks
- The Chinese in Central-Eastern Europe
- Survey Evidence from Central-Eastern Europe
- Political Incorporation amid Right-Wing Nationalism in Hungary
- Tax Collection and Political Incorporation: A Natural Experiment in Romania
- Beyond the Chinese: The Muslims in Central-Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective
- Beyond Central-Eastern Europe: The Chinese in Western Europe in Comparative Perspective
- Implications: Local Attitudes toward the Chinese (and Other Out-Groups)
- Implications: Best Practices
Ethnicity and Politics in Southeast Asia (Cambridge 2022) – with Jacob I. Ricks
What explains the treatment of ethnic minorities in Southeast Asia? We conceptually disaggregate ethnicity into multiple constituent markers – specifically language, religion, and phenotype. We then provide a theoretical framework: By focusing on the interaction between these three ethnic markers, we contend how these markers overlap can affect whether a minority integrates within a broader ethnic identity; successfully extracts accommodation as unique group; or engages in a contentious and potentially violent relationship with the hegemon. To test our argument, we explore the ethnic politics in six group-state dyads: (1) ethnic Lao in Thailand: integration; (2) ethnic Chinese in Thailand: integration; (3) ethnic Chinese in Malaysia: accommodation; (4) ethnic Malays in Singapore: accommodation; (5) ethnic Malays in Thailand: contention; and (6) ethnic Chinese in Indonesia: contention. We focus on these six cases because they lend themselves well to a larger most-similar comparative case design. [Publisher's Website] [Amazon]
Table of Contents
- Introduction [pdf]
- Ethnic Integration
- Ethnic Accommodation
- Ethnic Contention
- Conclusion